Abstract. We present a dynamic model of sequential information acquisition by a heterogeneous committee. At each date agents decide whether to continue deliberation, which generates costly information, or stop and take a binding vote yielding a decision. For homogeneous committees, the model is a reinterpretation of the classic Wald (1947) sequential testing of statistical hypotheses. In heterogeneous committees, the resources spent on deliberation depend on the committee's preference pro…le and on the rules governing the deliberation and decision-making processes. We show that voting rules at the decision stage are inconsequential when either information collection is cheap or deliberation rules are consensual. Furthermore, more heterogeneity of preferencess, more consensual deliberation rules, or more unanimous decision voting rules, lead to greater duration of deliberation and more accurate decisions. We argue that the model provides a useful way to think about jury deliberation and that it matches some stylized facts on jury decision making.
1. Introduction
Overview
Decision making in groups often involves deliberation. Juries, boards of directors, congressional and university committees, government agencies such as the FDA or the EPA, and many other committees, spend time deliberating issues before reaching a decision or issuing a recommendation. This paper presents a simple model of deliberation to study the e¤ect of the structure of the deliberative process, and of the composition of deliberating groups, on outcomes such as the accuracy of decisions, the length of deliberation, and the degree of disagreement.
Previous literature on deliberation has focused on asymmetric information among members of the deliberating group, on how this information asymmetry can impede e¤ective decision making, and on how di¤erent voting rules interact with this information asymmetry. 1 We abstract from private information and concentrate on a simpler aspect of collective action: how information collection responds to con ‡icting preferences. In a deliberating committee, there are two types of decisions to make: deliberation decisions and action decisions. Deliberation decisions are about whether to keep deliberating in order to obtain additional information. Action decisions regard the choice to be taken at the end of deliberation. Deliberation is in service of action decisions since the information that is obtained is supposed to allow more accurate action decisions. This paper discusses a novel dimension that emerges when studying sequential deliberation in committees: the distinction between deliberation rules and decision rules. A deliberation rule governs the deliberation process and determines when information acquisition must stop. A decision rule governs the vote over issues at the end of deliberation. Deliberation rules may be di¤erent from decision rules. For instance, in many committees, the chairman of the committee has the same power as all the other members over action decisions, but has a special role to play (and more power) in deliberation decisions. While decision rules are often quite precisely described -some issues requiring a majority vote, others requiring a supermajority or unanimity -deliberation rules are often vague. Despite this vagueness, our results suggest that it is important to study the role of the deliberation process, and to understand how it functions. Much of our analysis focuses on a particularly stark way of modeling committees that have more inclusive deliberation protocols than others. We model this inclusiveness as a threshold rule R d such that deliberation ends as soon as R d members of the committee vote to end deliberation. Decision rules are analogously captured by a rule R v that describes the speci…c quali…ed majority required for reaching a decision. We note that a special case of a deliberation rule in the jury setting corresponds to repeated straw polls, with a …nal vote taken according to the decision rule once su¢ cient consensus has been achieved. 2 Our analysis discusses the e¤ects of deliberation and decision rules on the length of deliberation, the accuracy of decisions, and the welfare of the committee and of society at large. We show that there is a sense in which deliberation rules are more "e¤ective"(or powerful) than decision rules. For instance, we show that under certain assumptions, decision rules are irrelevant, while deliberation rules a¤ect the length of deliberation and accuracy of ultimate decisions. Furthermore, we show that, for a range of parameters for which the decision rule does have an e¤ect, in contrast with Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) and Persico (2004) , unanimity leads to more informative outcomes than majority rule. We also show that, under certain symmetry assumptions, a committee would like to delegate deliberation power to a moderate chairman. Finally, we contrast sequential deliberation with static deliberation and argue that the sequential case displays a richness that is closer to the phenomena that are associated with deliberation.
The formal analysis in this paper is potentially relevant for a variety of collective decision processes such as R&D, hiring decisions, FDA drug approval, and so on. However, we focus much of our discussion on juries. This is partly because for concreteness it is useful to have a running application in mind. Furthermore, there are three additional reasons why we believe that juries are an interesting application for our model. First, in juries, the deliberation process is clear-cut and circumscribed:
there is a well-de…ned beginning and end of deliberation, the time it takes the jury to deliberate is measurable, and one single verdict is the typical outcome of such deliberation. Second, the jury setting allows us to contrast our analysis with much of the extant body of literature on deliberation that has focused predominantly on the jury context. Third, the empirical literature has documented some patterns of deliberation in juries that we will attempt to explain with our model. We elaborate on the precise interpretation of our setup in the context of juries after we formally introduce the model.
Technically, our analysis is a natural extension of much of the analysis of individual decision making to group contexts. Indeed, an important aspect of individual decision making is the appropriate amount of information to acquire before making a decision. An individual must weigh the cost of information against the value of making more accurate decisions. A classic approach to this question, going back to Wald (1947a,b) , is that of Bayesian sequential analysis. 3 In this approach an individual acquires information sequentially, and at every stage evaluates whether he has su¢ cient information to make a decision: if he does, he stops and takes a decision; if he does not, he proceeds to acquire additional information. Our paper provides an analysis of how collective action a¤ects such information acquisition. We use the term deliberation for this process.
In fact, our model is a collective action version of the analysis of sequential sampling introduced by Wald (1947a,b ). In our model, a homogeneous committee deliberates in a manner that is analogous to the decision maker testing a hypothesis sequentially à la Wald: at every date, the committee evaluates its current information and decides on one of three actions: continue sampling-i.e., continue deliberating, or stop and take one of two decisions, acquittal or conviction. Wald showed that the optimal procedure involves a sequential likelihood ratio test, whereby intermediate values of the likelihood ratio require obtaining a new sample, while high (low) values of the likelihood ratio require stopping and taking one (the other) decision. We depart from Wald by introducing two possible dimensions of disagreement among committee members. The …rst involves disagreement exclusively on the importance of the decision (or, equivalently, on the cost of information acquisition), and hence on the length of the deliberation process. In this …rst version, committee members share preferences over decisions conditional on the information available, but disagree on how much information is required before making the decision. The second version involves disagreement on the appropriate decision: for example, some jurors require a higher standard of evidence in order to vote to convict.
In this version, there can be disagreement at the deliberation and at the decision stage.
We assume that all information in the jury is public: signals are observed by all jurors, and preferences are common knowledge. This assumption represents a sharp departure from much of the extant literature on juries discussed below, where the focus is on the aggregation of private information. We view our model as a natural alternative extreme benchmark that is useful for identifying the tensions that arise in collective choice when trading o¤ information collection costs and decision accuracy.
Stylized Facts through the Lens of Sequential Deliberation
We now brie ‡y discuss some evidence from the literature on deliberation in juries. First, we present some evidence that suggests that the structure of our model may be a realistic reduced form for thinking about deliberation. We then present evidence that is consistent with our results and that our model can help explain and interpret. Deliberation structure Our model is consistent in spirit with the formal role of juries: for instance, Vidmar and Hans (2007) write "Formally their [the jurors'] task is to engage in sound fact …nding from the evidence produced at trial." This formal requirement appears to be partially consistent with practice in mock juries and with surveys of actual juries: a substantial fraction of deliberation appears to be devoted to a discussion of the facts. In fact, starting from Kalven and Zeisel (1966) , numerous legal scholars have argued that juries do a good job in reaching an understanding of the facts. For instance, in a study of mock juries Ellsworth (1989) writes: "In general, over the course of deliberation, jurors appear to focus more on the important facts and issues, come to a clearer understanding of them, and approach consensus on the facts." Furthermore, Hannaford et al. (2000) and Ellsworth (1989) report that some of the discussion during deliberation is about how to weigh con ‡icting pieces of evidence. 4 Importance of Deliberation One strand of literature (appearing mostly in law and psychology scholarship) studies opinion formation by jurors. This is relevant for our model for two reasons.
First, this establishes that the deliberation process is important in the formation of jurors'opinions. 5 Second, some features of the opinion formation process seem to mirror the updating process assumed in our model.
Hannaford, Hans, Mott, and Musterman (2000) studied the timing of jury opinion formation.
They used a special case study of a jury reform implemented in Arizona in 1995 that allowed for discussions during civil trial (Rule 39(f) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure). Their data includes survey responses of 1; 385 jurors from 172 trials in four counties (accounting for a large majority of cases in Arizona) concerning when they formed their initial opinions, whether and when they changed their minds, and when they arrived at a resolution regarding the …nal outcome. Over 95% of jurors reported changing their mind at least once over the course of the trial and 15% reported changing their minds more than once during trial. Importantly, over 40% of jurors reported changing their minds during the …nal deliberations, suggesting that deliberation is a key component of opinion formation.
Hans (2001, 2007) used surveys conducted by the National Center for State Courts (NCSC).
Hans'data contains reports from close to 3; 500 jurors who had participated in felony trials in four large, urban courts. Hans (2001 documents patterns of opinion change that are consistent with information collection driving a Bayesian updating process. Speci…cally, juries are classi…ed into di¤erent categories depending on the outcome of a straw poll that was taken early in the deliberation process. When the initial vote in the jury strongly supports a particular outcome, that outcome is more likely to ultimately emerge. For instance, 77 of the 89 juries with strong majorities for guilt convicted the defendant, but 11 of these 89 ended up acquitting the defendant, showing that in some cases, many jurors were persuaded during deliberation to switch their vote to acquittal. 6 Figure 1 summarizes the data in . For each initial leaning of the jury, it describes the distribution of ultimate outcomes.
Irrelevance of the decision rule Baldwin and McConville (1980) studied a reform that was put in place in 1974 in England that allowed for majority verdicts in criminal trials, while prior to the reform unanimity was required. The vast majority of verdicts (311 out of 326 cases) were unanimous even after the reform, suggesting that the decision rule did not have much of an e¤ect. Kalven and Zeisel (1966) report similar patterns for U.S. states that do not require unanimity for conviction: most verdicts are unanimous anyway. 7 Devine et al. (2001) report that in many mock jury studies there is no evidence that the decision rule has any e¤ect on the verdict. In lab experiments, Goeree and Yariv (2011) …nd that, when subjects cannot talk before voting, the decision rule has an e¤ect, whereas, when subjects can talk, the decision rule has very little e¤ect. Our model provides a possible explanation for the fact that the decision rule seems to have little or no e¤ect. We show that, when costs of deliberation are su¢ ciently low, in equilibrium, deliberation always ends with unanimous decisions: whenever there is disagreement on the appropriate decision to take, members of the committee agree that it is worthwhile to continue deliberating.
E¤ect on length of deliberation Hans (2001) and Devine et al. (2001) report that the decision rule a¤ects length and quality of deliberation. On average, using mock juries, under unanimity verdicts take as long as under majority. The quality, measured by legal experts, exhibits similar patterns -higher under unanimity than under majority.
In our model, the length of deliberation can be a¤ected by the decision rule since pivotal members at the deliberation stage may, if not pivotal at the decision stage, prolong deliberation in order to convince the holdouts at the decision stage.
Jury composition Increased heterogeneity has been found to increase quality and length of deliberation (see Sommers, 2006, and Goeree and Yariv, 2011 ).
In our model, increased heterogeneity increases the length of deliberation since it makes the pivotal members at the deliberation stage more extreme, and therefore more de…nitive information is needed in order to stop deliberation. This translates immediately into longer deliberation and, in symmetric committees, more accurate decisions.
Literature Review
The past two decades have delivered a rich collection of work on committee decision making (see Li and Suen, 2009 for an extended survey). Our paper ties directly to several strands of studies.
In terms of jury decision making, our setup can naturally be contrasted with several papers emphasizing information aggregation within juries. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) In comparison to all of this existing work, the main contribution of the framework proposed in this paper is that it allows for an analysis of the interplay between deliberation rules and decision rules. We identify when each plays an important role for outcomes, and how collective consequences are a¤ected by di¤erent aspects of the environment (deliberation costs, preference heterogeneity, etc.).
From a technical perspective, the starting point of our analysis is Wald (1947a,b) , who pioneered the study of sequential testing, and provided a characterization of the optimal sequential test as a sequential likelihood ratio test. We brie ‡y describe the most directly relevant result in section 3.1. 10 
The Model

Setup
A jury of n individuals has to determine the fate of a defendant. There are two states: I (the defendant is innocent) and G (the defendant is guilty), which we assume are equally likely ex-ante. 11 All juror's want to make accurate decisions: convict the guilty and acquit the innocent. However, they di¤er in the importance they attribute to the two possible mistakes: convicting the innocent or acquitting the guilty. Juror i's preferences are given by:
9 A related paper is that of Eso and Fong (2008) , who study a dynamic cheap talk model with multiple senders, where the receiver can choose when to make her decision. They show that when the senders are all informed of the state of nature, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists with instantenous, full revelation, regardless of the size and direction of the senders' biases. Wilson (2011) considers exogenous costs for both sending messages and receiving them, and illustrates the dependence of e¤ective communication on agents'quality of information and messaging costs.
1 0 Moscarini and Smith (2001) consider a di¤erent extension of Wald's analysis, where they allow for simultaneous as well as sequential experimentation, and assume discounting and convex costs of sample size. Chan and Suen (2011) use the Wald setting to study the impact of heterogeneous patience among group members. 1 1 Much of our analysis can be easily extended to the asymmetric case.
where q i captures the juror's concern for convicting the innocent relative to that for acquitting the guilty. In a static model without information collection, q i is also the threshold of reasonable doubt:
the juror would want to convict if his posterior is higher than q i , and acquit otherwise. Without loss of generality, we assume q 1 q 2 ::: q n . We also assume that q 1 > 0 and q n < 1 (otherwise at least one of the jurors is not responsive to information collection).
In determining the verdict, the jury participates in two phases: deliberation and decision making.
We assume that deliberation allows each juror to publicly acquire information about the guilt of the defendant. We formalize this collective information generation as follows. If the jurors still deliberate at time t; all observe the realization of the sequence of random variables X 1 ; :::; X t , where X 1 ; X 2 ; :::: are independent and identically distributed conditional on the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Each random variable is drawn from an atomless distribution characterized by cumulative distribution functions F G ( ) F ( jG) when the defendant is guilty and F I ( ) F ( jI) when the defendant is innocent. 12 The cost of deliberating an additional period is given by k > 0 per unit of time per agent. This is the cost of obtaining an additional signal (or the opportunity costs of time spent deliberating).
At each period, the jury decides whether to continue or stop deliberating using a threshold voting rule. Namely, at each period t; after having observed the history X 1 ; :::; X t , each agent casts a vote whether to continue or stop information collection. Under deliberation rule R d = n 2 ; :::; n; whenever at least R d jurors choose to stop deliberating, the deliberation phase ends.
Once deliberation comes to a halt, the decision phase takes place. The jury selects an alternative by voting. Each juror can vote to acquit, a; or to convict, c: Under the decision rule R v = n 2 ; : : : ; n; the alternative C is selected if and only if R v or more jurors vote to convict, the alternative A is selected if and only if R v or more jurors vote to acquit, and the jury is hung otherwise. We assume that when the jury is hung, A or C are determined by the ‡ip of a fair coin. 13 We restrict attention to strategies that depend only on posterior beliefs p (and not on the history of prior votes). Therefore, a pure strategy is a pair ( d ; v ), where the deliberation strategy is 
Discussion of the model
The model is an extension of Wald (1947a,b) to study how collective action a¤ects information collection. In the model, longer deliberation corresponds to additional signals received by the committee. Our interpretation is that this is a reasonable shortcut for thinking about how deliberation helps jurors gain an understanding of the evidence presented at trial. Of course, in a jury setting, it could be claimed that no additional information is received by the jurors during deliberation. We argue that one role of deliberation is to sift through the mass of sometimes con ‡icting evidence presented by two opposing parties (prosecution and defense) during the trial to …gure out the relevance of di¤erent pieces of information, and the appropriate weight to attribute to these in establishing guilt or innocence of the defendant. In a way, the trial is like a lecture given by a professor, and the jury is like a study group that looks through the notes taken during class to gain some further understanding of a problem at hand.
As mentioned above, there are many alternative applications that may …t directly with the model because actual additional signals are received as deliberation continues/information is gathered.
Abstractly, any scenario in which a group gathers information over time regarding two possible courses of action, with a status quo being chosen if the group cannot come to an agreement, shares features with our model. More concretely, in an R&D process, agents receive feedback about the likely success of speci…c avenues of research; in a drug approval process, the FDA can require additional clinical trials to be performed, and in fact, the FDA approval process is explicitly designed to require several stages of testing; in hiring practices, follow-up interviews can be requested, or additional research into a candidate can be performed; a board of directors can require additional due diligence before proceeding with a merger; and so on and so forth.
The assumption that information about both signals and preferences is public is particularly stark. It contrasts with prior work in which the focus is mostly on the aggregation of private information, and the information acquisition aspect of the collective process is disregarded. We believe that this is a useful benchmark, and that the forces highlighted in this paper would also be present under information asymmetries. However, introducing private information would naturally enrich the scope of the analysis. 14 We concentrate on supermajoritarian deliberation rules, i.e., R d n=2: Our analysis could easily be extended to deliberation rules R d < n=2. In fact, we use supermajoritarian deliberation rules simply as a way to capture succinctly the e¤ective agenda setters during deliberation and highlight the interplay between these agents and those pivotal during the decision phase. Our analysis could allow for the speci…cation of arbitrary agenda setters in the deliberation phase that do not come about through a vote (as is the case in settings in which, say, a committee chair determines when discussions should come to a halt).
Another restriction that we impose is that there are only two alternatives to choose from. This restriction is common to many voting models. It is not possible to obtain sharp characterizations in a model with more than two alternatives. However, we do consider a continuous action version of a simpler model (that illustrates the robustness of our basic results), which we discuss in Section 8.3.
Preliminaries
Homogeneous Preferences
We start by considering the benchmark of a homogenous jury containing agents with the same preference parameter: q 1 = ::: = q n q: In that case, the agents all face the same objective at both phases of the process. Consequently, we focus on equilibria that emulate the single person decision (by voting in unison during both the deliberation and decision phase, we discuss our equilibrium notion in Section 3.3 below). In this section we discuss the case in which n = 1: From Wald (1947a,b), we know the solution is unique. Formally, Proposition 1 (Wald, 1947 ) A unique equilibrium exists and is characterized by two thresholds:
the agent stops information collection and acquits whenever p t p a ; the agent stops information collection and convicts whenever p t p c ; the agent continues information collection whenever p t 2 (p a ; p c ): 1 5 Recall that the prior probability that the defendant is guilty is 1=2. In particular, choosing a threshold p a 1=2 (or p c 1=2) would lead to no information collection. Our assumption that p a 1=2 p c is therefore without loss of generality.
While we do not provide the proof of Proposition 1, it is useful for our analysis to illustrate the intuition behind the proposition as it is translated to our setup. 16 Fix the information cost k: For any posterior probability p, denote by V 0 (p) the value function associated with stopping immediately at posterior p.
Denote by V 1 (p) the value associated with continuing at least one more period, and V (p) the overall value function for any posterior probability p. 17 It follows that
Note that V (0) = V (1) = 0, and therefore,
is a convex function of p. Indeed, consider an alternative world in which with probability ; the probability that the defendant is guilty is given by p 1 and with probability 1 ; the probability that the defendant is guilty is given by p 2 . If the (one) juror is not told which of the two probabilities had been realized, then she can guarantee the continuation value corresponding to
However, if she is told which of the two probabilities is realized, then with probability , she can guarantee the continuation value of p 1 and with probability 1 the continuation value of p 2 :
Naturally, she can ignore the information provided to her, so in the latter case she must be gaining at least as much. Convexity follows. From linearity of (1 q) p and q (1 p), and the fact that their maximal value of 0 is achieved at p = 0; 1; respectively, it follows that there are two posterior probabilities (that the defendant is guilty), p a and p c , that de…ne the stopping region, as in Figure   2 .
When costs are high, they outweigh the bene…ts of information collection and stopping occurs immediately (in terms of Figure 2 , when k is su¢ ciently high, the curve corresponding to the continuation payo¤ lies below that corresponding to the instantaneous utility from stopping). When costs are su¢ ciently low, there is an interior solution. Note that convexity of the value function assures the uniqueness of such an equilibrium. 18 1 6 This discussion is adapted from De Groot (1970). 1 7 The continuation value V 1 (p) is essentially the expectation of V (p) with respect to the potential posteriors in the period that follows, minus the cost of an additional information unit k: 1 8 In fact, from stationarity of the process, the identi…ed thresholds would correspond to equilibria for any prior The following proposition summarizes the e¤ects of changes in the preference parameter q and the cost of deliberation k.
Proposition 2 (Homogeneous Juries -Comparative Statics)
1. Preference Parameter q. p a (q; k); p c (q; k) weakly increase in q.
2.
Cost k: p a (q; k) weakly increases in k; p c (q; k) weakly decreases in k. Consequently, the time to take a decision is weakly decreasing in k.
Intuitively, as q increases, agents care more about convicting the innocent relative to acquitting the guilty. It follows that they are willing to spend more time preventing the former relative to the latter, and that the range of posteriors for which the jury acquits becomes larger (similarly, the range of posteriors for which the jury convicts becomes smaller). When the cost k increases, less information is gathered (implying that the posterior thresholds shift toward the prior) and therefore deliberation takes less time.
probability of guilt.
The Constrained Problem
Much of our analysis centers on heterogeneous groups. As will become transparent later, in such contexts, for di¤erent regions of the posterior, di¤erent sets of agents are potentially keen to stop or continue deliberation. In particular, the 'pivotal'agents may change with the posterior. In that respect, an agent who has the opportunity to end deliberation must evaluate the stopping problem bearing in mind that, in some other regions of the posterior, where he would ideally like to stop, other agents will force continuation. Consequently, agents face a constrained version of the original Wald problem. The following considers what will turn out to be the relevant constrained problem that is faced within heterogeneous juries.
For any two thresholds p a ; p c ; p a 1=2 p c ; expected utility can be expressed as:
where T (p a ; p c ) denotes the expected time to approach one of the posterior thresholds p a or p c : The The expectations E (pjp a ) or E (pjp c ) denote the expected value of the posterior upon the end of deliberation conditional on passing the threshold p a or p c …rst, respectively. 20 For presentational simplicity, we assume that the signal distributions F G and F I are su¢ ciently well-behaved so that Pr(p x …rstj p a ; p c ), E (pjp x ) ; and T (p a ; p c ) are twice continuously di¤erentiable with respect to p a and p c ; for x = a; c. This allows us to use calculus techniques to identify equilibrium attributes. The assumption is satis…ed for many commonly used signal distributions. For instance, it holds if F G and F I are normal distributions.
We now turn to some properties of the constrained problem that prove useful subsequently.
We consider a constrained problem de…ned by two thresholds, p p, such that the juror can only choose to stop and to acquit if p p, and to stop and convict if p p. This constrained problem is helpful when constructing best responses in the model with heterogeneous jurors. For any p; p,
we de…ne the constrained value functions as follows (dropping the arguments q and k). As before, V 1 pjp; p is the value of continuing at least one period. The overall value function is given by:
The interpretation of this expression is the following: for p p, the juror chooses the best option between continuing deliberation and stopping to acquit. For p p p, the juror can only continue deliberation. For p p, the decision maker chooses the best option between continuing deliberation and stopping to convict.
Lemma 1 (Convexity for Constrained Problem)
The continuation value function V 1 pjp; p of the constrained problem is convex for p 2 [0; p), and for p 2 (p; 1].
Convexity of the continuation value for the constrained problem follows through similar (standard) arguments to those used for the unconstrained problem: again, the logic is that information about p is useful to the decision maker. As before, convexity implies that the solution is determined in a similar manner to that described through Figure 2 and uniqueness of the constrained solution p a p; p ; p c p; p follows. The following lemma illustrates that the constrained solution is monotonic in the imposed thresholds.
Lemma 2 (Monotonicity) p a p; p is increasing in p and p c p; p is increasing in p.
Monotonicity of the best responses is intuitive. Indeed, suppose one of the thresholds, say p;
increases. The consequence is that the problem facing the decision maker is more constrained, and so the continuation value decreases. By referring to Figure 2 , when the continuation values decreases, the left intersection point increases, implying that p a p; p increases. 21 Similar arguments hold for changes in p:
An immediate consequence of Proposition 2 and Lemma 2 is the following (recalling that best responses in the constrained problem depend on the underlying preference parameter and information cost, which we do not spell out for readability's sake):
Corollary 1 (Comparative Statics of the Constrained Problem) For any …xed p; p , p a p; p and p c p; p weakly increase in q: 2 1 There is a subtlety because convexity of the value function is only guaranteed in a subinterval. However, as showed in the proof of Lemma 1, this is the relevant interval for determining the stopping thresholds.
Heterogeneous Preferences
We now shift our attention to juries composed of agents with potentially heterogeneous preferences. Namely, we assume q 1 q 2 ::: q n and allow for some of the inequalities to be strict:
In order to isolate the e¤ects of preference heterogeneity on outcomes, we assume that deliberation costs are homogenous and …xed at k > 0. 22 Note that there are many possible sources of multiplicity in an environment such as ours: …rst, voting games are known to display equilibria in weakly dominated strategies in which voters vote in consensus independently of their preferences because unilateral deviations cannot a¤ect outcomes (when voting rules are non-unanimous); second, there is a potential multiplicity linked to the in…nite horizon nature of the game. Throughout the paper, we focus on equilibria satisfying two requirements:
1. Each juror's strategy is characterized by two time-independent thresholds for the posterior, 2 2 We return to the case of heterogeneous costs in Section 8.2. 2 3 Recall that the prior probability that the defendant is guilty is 1=2. In particular, choosing a threshold p a 1=2 (or p c 1=2) would lead to no information collection. Our assumption that p a 1=2 p c is therefore without loss of generality. 2 4 Behavior according to (stationary) thresholds as well as sincerity could be thought of as the consequence of the following re…nement to Markov equilibria in our setting. Consider …nite horizon truncations of our game and focus on subgame perfect equilibria that survive iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies in which last-date strategies are eliminated …rst. The limits of such sequences of equilibria as the horizon becomes in…nitely large correspond to individual threshold strategies satisfying our sincere voting restriction.
For homogeneous committees, the above requirements boil down to selecting the Pareto-best equilibrium, which yields the same allocation as the single-person optimum. For readability purposes, and slightly abusing terminology, we will simply refer to the corresponding set as the set of 'equilibria' (or 'equilibrium'when unique).
We start by considering the case in which voting rules in the deliberation and decision stage coincide. That is, R d = R v : This allows us to focus on one set of pivotal agents, rather than consider pivotal agents at each stage of the decision-making process. It is also a case that is relevant for many applications: for example, it …ts environments in which deliberation manifests as an opinion poll.
Later, we inspect the impacts of discordance between the two types of rules. (ii) Strictly fewer than R d 1 other agents want to stop. In this case, deliberation must continue and juror i is in a constrained region in which deliberation continues regardless of her vote.
(iii) Exactly R d 1 other jurors want to stop. In this case juror i can a¤ect the stopping decision.
As mentioned at the beginning of our presentation of the constrained problem in the previous subsection, because of heterogeneity in preferences, for di¤erent regions of the posterior, di¤erent agents are potentially keen to stop or continue deliberation.
The main complication, relative to the homogeneous jury setting, arises from the fact that the juror has no control over stopping in case (ii). 25 This means that the juror's optimal action in region (iii) depends on the magnitude of the region of posteriors over which case (ii) arises. From the perspective of this juror, we can see her problem as being a constrained optimization problem where she takes as given the fact that she cannot stop in a certain region.
Intuitively, when posterior probabilities of guilt are low, it is the jurors who care most about the mistake of convicting the innocent that determine the decision. Note that whenever agent j prefers to continue deliberation, so does any agent l > j who worries even more about innocent convictions.
In particular, whenever juror j = R d chooses to continue deliberation, or vote to convict, so will all jurors l > R d , and deliberation will carry on. In other words, when guilt posteriors are low, juror R d is 'pivotal'. Similarly, whenever posterior probabilities of guilt are high, it is the jurors who worry most about guilty acquittals that determine decisions, the relevant pivotal juror being juror n R d + 1: Therefore, as in the case of the median voter theorem, we can focus on a small number of decisive people. Namely, in our model there are typically two decisive voters. Lemma 
::: q n are also equilibrium thresholds of a jury composed of two jurors with preference parameters q n R d +1 ; q R d in which both deliberation and decision rules are unanimous.
Best responses of the pivotal agents can be derived through optimization of the constrained decision problem with the value function from equation (4). Each of the agents takes one of the thresholds as given and optimally chooses the other one (that corresponds to the region she cares more about). We denote by p the lower equilibrium threshold and by p the upper equilibrium threshold. Lemma 3 implies that p = p a (p ; p ; q n R d +1 ), and p = p c (p ; p ; q R d ). 26 Note that these considerations imply that, for su¢ ciently low costs k; threshold equilibria exist.
In what follows, we move away from the assumption that R d = R v and inspect the consequences of di¤erent deliberation and decision rules in general juries.
Arbitrary Deliberation and Voting Rules
We now consider a jury composed of n jurors of arbitrary preferences q 1 q 2 ::: q n and contemplate di¤ering constellations of voting rules. When R d 6 = R v ; there are two sets of relevant pivotal agents: those pertaining to the deliberation stage and those pertaining to the decision stage.
In analogy to Lemma 3, during the decision stage, whenever juror j would prefer to convict if she were dictator, so would any juror l < j: Whenever juror j would prefer to acquit if she were dictator, so would any juror l > j. It follows that the jurors to focus on are those pivotal during deliberation: 
Lemma 4 implies that any set of jurors would agree on the decision ex-post when costs are su¢ ciently low even if unanimity is not a requirement for making decisions. 27 Furthermore, Lemma 4 implies that jurors may change their stand both individually and collectively (say, as would be re ‡ected in a poll) during deliberation. Indeed, let p 1 = q 1 and p 2 = q n and assume that q 1 < 1=2 and q n > 1=2: From the lemma, for su¢ ciently small deliberation costs, deliberation continues even in instances in which all agents would agree to acquit (p < p t < q 1 ) or all would agree to convict (q n < p t < p ) had deliberation been forced to end. This, of course, means that if repeated polls were taken during the deliberation phase, shifts in preferred verdicts could be observed. This is, of course, a direct consequence of our modeling deliberation as learning, but it is consistent with some of the empirical research on jury deliberation processes. For example, Hans The lemma also implies that for su¢ ciently low costs, deliberation will lead to consensus on the decision to be taken: the jury will deliberate for an amount of time that is such that the only possible posteriors are su¢ ciently extreme that they are either to the left of q 1 or to the right of q n .
In particular, the voting rule R v in the decision stage does not matter, and only the deliberation rule determines the length of the deliberation process.
There is another class of cases in which the voting rule R v does not a¤ect outcomes. Fix a deliberation rule R d that is a strict super-majority. Then, any decision rule that is at most as consensual as R d (R v R d ) leads to the same equilibrium outcomes. The reason is fairly mechanical:
whenever there is a su¢ cient super-majority to halt deliberation, there must be at least the same 2 7 This result relies on the fact that jurors care about both types of mistakes: convicting the innocent and acquitting the guilty, so thatq1;q2 6 = 0; 1: Naturally, asq1 approaches 0 orq2 approaches 1; the costs of assuring ex-post concensus approach 0:
super-majority at the decision stage. This is just the Wald logic: thresholds for stopping deliberation are inherently more demanding than the threshold (q) for taking a decision. Thus, equilibrium outcomes do not depend on R v in this region.
The following proposition summarizes our discussion of the two cases in which the decision rule has no e¤ect on …nal outcomes. are not too high, some additional deliberation may therefore be bene…cial. Intuitively then, in these cases one should expect that a unanimity voting rule at the decision stage will lead to longer deliberation and more accurate decisions than simple majority. We show below that this is true for juries with symmetric preferences (around 1=2). When juries are asymmetric, changing the decision rule or the deliberation rule may not lead to uniformly more accurate decisions because, for instance, more accurate acquittal decisions may come hand in hand with less accurate conviction decisions: it can be the case that, say, making the decision rule more extreme reduces the acquittal equilibrium threshold p but also reduces the equilibrium conviction threshold p .
Symmetric Juries
For simplicity, we …rst go back to the case R d = R v : Lemma 3 allows us to restrict attention to two jurors within the jury with preferences: 
De…nition (Symmetry in Juries)
We say the jury is quasi-symmetric with respect to R d = R v whenever q n R d +1 +q R d = 1 and information is symmetric, i.e., for any s 0,
A jury is symmetric whenever it is quasi-symmetric with respect to all voting rules.
When juries are quasi-symmetric, we focus on symmetric threshold equilibria corresponding to the relevant deliberation rule, ones in which both posterior thresholds are symmetric around 1=2 (i.e., equally distanced from 1=2). 28 As it turns out, quasi-symmetric juries generate unique predictions, established in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 (Quasi-symmetric Juries -Uniqueness) Assume the jury is quasi-symmetric with respect to R d : Then, there exists a unique stationary symmetric threshold equilibrium.
Lemma 5 implies that when the jury is symmetric and costs are su¢ ciently low, symmetric equilibrium thresholds are determined uniquely for any decision rule. The lemma is a direct consequence of the monotonicity implied by Lemma 2. Indeed, if there were two threshold equilibria, the ranking of the left thresholds must coincide with the ranking of the right thresholds. Therefore, it is impossible for two such equilibria to both be symmetric.
We start our analysis with juries that are quasi-symmetric with pivotal jurors as above,q 1 = As b increases, the juror with preference parameterq 1 is increasingly concerned about acquitting the guilty, while the juror with preference parameterq 2 is increasingly concerned about convicting the innocent. There are now two forces at play. The direct one is that the …rst agent would like to spend more time collecting information when the posterior is lower than 1=2, while the second agent would like to spend more time collecting information when the posterior is greater than 1=2. Indeed, this follows from the …rst part of Proposition 2, implying that (dropping the explicit dependence on k)
The indirect e¤ect comes from the strategic interaction. Consider, say, the …rst juror and the event in which the posterior p t 2 (p a (q 1 ); p a (q 2 )); so that if she were by herself she would continue collecting information, while the other juror by herself would not. Importantly, the continuation value for pursuing information collection is lowered by the existence of the other juror. Indeed, juror 1 knows that when p t > 1=2, juror 2 will demand longer deliberation than juror 2 would like (in the analogous range p t 2 (p c (q 1 ); p c (q 2 ))). Thus, continuation values are lower, leading to equilibrium thresholds that are moderate relative to the most extreme individual thresholds p a (q 1 ); p c (q 2 ); as depicted in Figure 3 We now discuss the e¤ects of decision rules beyond the cases of irrelevance highlighted in Proposition 3.
As it turns out, when the decision rule R v is more consensual than the deliberation rule R d ,
non-trivial symmetric equilibrium thresholds are still determined uniquely. Essentially, there are two cases to consider. First, when costs of deliberation are low, the equilibrium deliberation thresholds are su¢ ciently wide that the super-majority requirement at the decision stage is automatically met and exceeded. In the second case, with higher costs and R v > R d , the pivotal 2 9 Part 2 of the Proposition is related to Strulovici (2010) , who calls a similar phenomenon in an experimentation environment a "loss of control e¤ect". It is also related to Chan and Suen (2011) , who illustrate in a collective learning environment akin to ours that an impatient member can lead a more patient committee to hasten decisions. jurors at the deliberation stage would like to settle for deliberation thresholds p > q n Rv+1 and p < q Rv . However, such thresholds would lead to a hung jury. In this scenario, the equilibrium deliberation thresholds are driven by the requirement to reach su¢ cient consensus at the decision stage so we obtain p = q n Rv+1 and p = q Rv : deliberation continues until the moment the pivotal jurors at the decision stage are persuaded to join the required consensus. When costs are su¢ ciently high, achieving a consensus at the decision stage becomes too costly for the pivotal jurors at the deliberation stage and the unique equilibrium outcome involves no information collection and an immediate hung jury.
In the following proposition, we denote by (p (R d ; R v ; k) ; p (R d ; R v ; k)) the unique symmetric equilibrium thresholds corresponding to deliberation rule R d and decision rule R v R d :
Proposition 5 (Decision Rule Relevance: Inclusiveness E¤ect) Consider a symmetric jury.
For any deliberation rule R d , take two voting rulesR v > R v R d .
1. There exist k; k such that, for k < k < k, corresponding symmetric equilibrium thresholds
the larger the supermajority required for making a decision, the more information collection there is; the deliberation time and decision accuracy are greater under voting ruleR v than under voting rule R v .
2.
There exists k such that, for k < k; corresponding symmetric equilibrium thresholds satisfy Assume also that R d corresponds to simple majority. We contemplate the e¤ect of moving from R v = simple majority to R v = unanimity. Suppose that costs of deliberation are su¢ ciently high that when R v corresponds to a simple majority, it is not worthwhile for the median juror to deliberate long enough to reach consensus on the decision. Then, under unanimity, the median juror who is still pivotal in the deliberation process understands that, in order to reach a verdict, she cannot stop deliberation as early as when R v = simple majority. In order to avoid a hung jury she must convince the extreme jurors to vote with everyone else. This requires longer deliberation. When costs are not too high, it is worthwhile to deliberate just long enough to obtain these jurors'votes on the decision.
Continuing the same example, Part 2 of Proposition 5 says that moving to R d = unanimity would lead to even longer deliberation. The reason is that the most extreme jurors are now in a position to directly a¤ect the deliberation decision, and they desire longer deliberation than the median juror.
Taken together with Proposition 3, Part 2 of Proposition 5 suggests that deliberation rules are more powerful than decision rules in driving the process of jury decision making and deliberation.
These results imply that, in essence, interior equilibria always depend only on two jurors. When
, the jury outcome is equivalent to that of a jury composed of two jurors with preferences q R d and q n R d +1 (and unanimous deliberation and voting rules), while when R v > R d ; any jury outcome entailing non-trivial deliberation is equivalent to that of a jury composed of two jurors with preferences q Rv and q n Rv+1 (and, again, unanimous deliberation and voting rules).
In practice (and outside our model), it may be the case that a change in the decision voting rule is tied to a change in the deliberation rule, a so-called protocol e¤ ect. In the presence of such a protocol e¤ect, the decision voting rule has a clear impact. Indeed, when the voting and decision rules coincide, Lemma 3 holds, so that two pivotal jurors determine the outcome. The more demanding the decision voting rule, the more extreme these two jurors are. Consequently, more stringent decision voting rules would correspond to longer deliberation and more accurate decisions.
Welfare and Delegation
Welfare e¤ects of deliberation rules and decision rules depend on the perspective from which welfare is calculated. One point of view is to only consider the ex-ante welfare of the jury. Another is to include the bene…t of accurate decisions for society at large, including individuals who do not directly bear the cost of deliberation.
First consider a homogeneous jury. From the point of view of the agents, deliberation is weakly bene…cial. Indeed, the jury can always choose not to deliberate by …xing the thresholds at the prior 1=2; p a = p c = 1=2. From an institutional point of view, when deliberating groups are homogeneous, a designer (say, the constitution writers) characterized by preference parameter q, who internalizes the costs (e.g., when these costs are linked to the time spent on making decisions and not engaging in other pro…table activities) is best o¤ with a committee (jury) comprised of identical agents of preference parameter q as well. In fact, a committee composed of more extreme agents than the designer would entail "too much"information collection. The designer may then bene…t by increasing the costs experienced by the committee members, or putting a cap on deliberation time.
From the perspective of the participating jurors, in any quasi-symmetric jury, we can assess the optimal spread of the pivotal agents. It turns out that little spread is most preferred, as captured by the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (Optimal Delegation) Jurors have unanimous preferences over deliberation rules:
all jurors in a symmetric jury prefer pivotal agents with as little spread as possible or
Intuitively, recall expression (3) for a juror's utility. In a symmetric jury, thresholds are symmetric, and therefore, the …rst two terms in (3) are a convex combination (via q i ) of an identical expected probability of mistake. It follows that the expected utility does not explicitly depend on q i :
In particular, all of the jurors gain the same level of expected utility as would a juror with preference parameter 1 2 if she were to have the equilibrium thresholds imposed upon her. However, note that a juror with preference parameter 1 2 would prefer no spread at all (b = 0 in our notation above), as then she receives her optimal thresholds. Monotonicity then implies our result. 31 Proposition 6 is particularly stark because of symmetry. However, the e¤ect highlighted in this proposition is more general: in a large class of asymmetric juries, the most extreme jurors will not push for unanimity at the deliberation stage because unanimity means that deliberation is long on both sides of the prior, making the cost of deliberation too high from an ex-ante perspective to make it worth reducing the probability of mistakes further.
It is also useful to point to a contrast between decision rules and deliberation rules at this point. Proposition 6 provides a rationale for giving moderate jurors control over the deliberation phase of the trial. This could be done by the implementation of rules requiring a small majority (optimally, a simple majority rule) or by delegating the decision to a moderate chairman (optimally, with preference parameter q = 1=2). Nonetheless, at least some jurors may prefer a more stringent decision rule to determine the verdict. Indeed, no juror would willingly give up her voice in the decision phase and choose a decision rule that would end up excluding her. In particular, we cannot expect the same level of agreement on decision rules as the one achieved over deliberation rules.
Simultaneous Deliberation
We now discuss a case in which the decision on the amount of information to be collected takes place in one shot and contrast this case with the sequential one considered up to now. When committee members are homogeneous, this is equivalent to the classic case of choosing the optimal sample size for the test of a binary hypothesis (see De Groot 1970, Chapter 11). We retain the jury language although the jury setting is no longer the natural application for this case. Nonetheless, there are many environments in which the size of the sample is determined at the outset. For example, drug companies decide on the sample size of patients at the beginning of many drug trials, academic departments decide on the number of outside recommendation letters at the start of most promotion processes, etc. 32 In our version with heterogeneous jurors we need to specify some additional details of the model.
A deliberation decision determines the sample size t. A sample of size t costs each juror kt. This is the only cost born by the committee. At time t, jurors observe the realization of the sequence of random variables X 1 ; :::; X t , and they vote to acquit or convict according to a decision rule R v just as in Section 2. Deliberation can be modeled in a number of ways but, for concreteness, we assume the following process. Deliberation takes place at no cost before the sample is drawn according to deliberation rule R d . An index moves over discrete time starting from 1. At index , if jurors have not yet come to an agreement, then jurors vote on whether sample size is acceptable. If at least R d jurors agree that the sample size is su¢ cient, then the deliberation process is over and a sample of size is drawn. If fewer than R d jurors agree, then the index moves on to +1. The process continues until an R d majority is satis…ed. This model would be identical to our sequential deliberation model if voters had to stop deliberation without seeing the realizations of the random variables. Given our result below that deliberation is always unanimous, the exact deliberation protocol is irrelevant for symmetric juries. 33 However, the model described above is easier to work with and is a closer match 3 2 It would, of course, be interesting to consider a mixed model, where decisions are partly sequential, partly simultaneous. In such a setting, at each date the commitee decides on a sample size, but the sample size can be augmented later. Moscarini and Smith (2001) provide an analysis of this problem for the single agent case. 3 3 We could allow for a once and for all deliberation vote over the in…nite set of alternatives corresponding to di¤erent sample sizes. We intentionally set this version of the model in the framework of binary decisions as it captures the same issues conceptually and allows us to naturally circumvent standard issues of equilibrium multiplicity that arise in voting models with more than two alternatives.
to the sequential deliberation model. 34 Let p t be the posterior if the deliberation process has yielded a sample size t. Then, at date t; a juror of type q votes to convict if p t q, and votes to acquit if p t < q. If at least R v votes are obtained, then a decision is reached. Otherwise we have a hung jury. 35 Proposition 7 (Simultaneous Deliberation: Voting Rule Relevance) In a symmetric jury, under simultaneous deliberation, jurors have common preferences over deliberation decisions.
Therefore, the deliberation rule R d is irrelevant. However, the voting rule matters: if e R v > R v , a jury voting under voting rule e R v chooses to collect more information.
The intuition for the irrelevance of the deliberation rule is related to the intuition of Proposition 6. Given that deliberation is simultaneous, jurors evaluate the optimal amount of information to be collected ex-ante, before seeing the realization of any signals. All jurors simply trade o¤ increased accuracy against the cost of information collection independent of their preference parameters because increased information collection reduces mistakes of both types equally.
The intuition for the e¤ect of the voting rule is the following. Under simultaneous deliberation, for any given amount of gathered information, a larger voting rule raises the probability of a hung jury. Acquiring additional information reduces the probability of this costly event.
This result is in sharp contrast with the results we obtained for the case of sequential deliberation. This is not very surprising given the very di¤erent nature of deliberation in the two scenarios.
The contrast between the consequences of simultaneous as opposed to sequential protocols is also familiar from the literature on search and auctions. Note also that, in contrast with the case of sequential deliberation, even with symmetry, the simultaneous scenario allows for the coexistence of signi…cant information collection and hung juries.
There are a number of interesting additional comparisons that can be made between the sequential and simultaneous scenarios. First, there is a strong general e¤ect leading to welfare being higher under sequential deliberation: welfare is obviously unambiguously higher in the sequential case for the case of a single juror because more e¢ cient use of information is made. Indeed, this was the original motivation behind Wald's analysis. By Proposition 6 we can also conclude that welfare from the point of view of the committee is higher in the sequential case under simple majority when juries are symmetric.
Another interesting comparison concerns the likelihood of consensual votes. For low costs, sequential deliberation leads to unanimous verdicts regardless of the decision rule (see Proposition 3).
In contrast, simultaneous deliberation generates a positive probability of some disagreement for any voting rule, for any costs, because there are always positive probability sets of signals that are not very informative. For intermediate costs the comparison is less straightforward, but, for any …xed voting rule, simultaneous deliberation tends to generate more variation in consensus because in the case of sequential deliberation the vote is more likely to end at a quorum. we compare two populations, characterized by distributions G and G 0 , with one more variant than the other, so that G 0 is a mean preserving spread of G; the expected order statistics will be more extreme under G 0 than under G:
Even though Lemma 3 holds and, for any selected jury, it is only two jurors who e¤ectively determine outcomes, the size of the jury now plays an important role as well since it a¤ects the 3 6 In some cases, the process of voir dire in commonwealth countries as well as the U.S. e¤ectively restricts preference pro…les of juries. Nonetheless, the process cannot pick out fully the characteristics of jurors and so some randomness remains. This is true for many other collective decision processes in which the agenda is set for several generations of agents, so that rules are not tailored to a particular familiar committee. 3 7 We can think of the institutional designers as the constitution writers, who put agendas in place having only a distribution of cases and juries in mind.
variance of the preferences of these two pivotal jurors. In that respect, it would be important to understand the curvature of the (constrained) best-response thresholds. This would be especially important if one considered agenda setters that experience some level of risk aversion (which, in our baseline model, plays no role). In such settings, it is the interplay between the size of the jury and the voting rule that determines the distribution of outcomes.
For su¢ ciently large n; juries will be approximately symmetric. Therefore, using the results of Proposition 4, we make two conjectures. First, more stringent voting and deliberation rules will generate more extreme pivotal jurors and therefore lead to greater expected times to decisions and smaller expected probabilities of mistakes. Similarly, …xing the voting rule and contemplating a distribution G 0 that is a mean preserving spread of G; would yield more extreme pivotal jurors and analogous e¤ects on timing and accuracy of outcomes.
Heterogeneous Deliberation Costs.
Suppose now that jurors di¤er in the costs that are imposed upon them through deliberation (e.g., if costs are linked with the time away from work, variance in wages may translate to variance in deliberation costs). Formally, in order to assess the e¤ects of cost heterogeneity, we assume that all jurors share the same preference parameter q, but juror i 0 s deliberation cost is given by k i ; where without loss of generality k 1 k 2 ::: k n :
Note that the decision rule R v does not a¤ect outcomes since for any given posterior the jurors all agree on the optimal action to be taken. The voting rule, however, does have an e¤ect. Whenever agent j wants to stop information collection, so does any agent experiencing higher costs (l < j).
It follows that the pivotal juror during deliberation is the R d 'th juror. Consequently, we get the following. Suppose we allow a limited degree of heterogeneity among jurors that, as above, is given by how costly it is for them to continue collecting information (in the current setting, this will be tantamount to allowing heterogeneity in how strongly each juror desires to make the correct decision). Speci…cally, assume the payo¤s for each juror if true damages are D and the jury awards Q are given by
where > 0:
The jury deliberates as in the model presented in Section 2: at each deliberation date they observe a new signal X t at cost k. The sequence X 1 ; X 2 ; ::: is conditionally i.i.d., normal with mean D and precision p X (i.e., for all t; X t N (D;
The jury stops deliberating if at least R d jurors vote to stop, otherwise it continues. Note that, given the assumption about payo¤s, once deliberation has ended, the jury is unanimous about the optimal decision. Thus, all disagreements arise in deliberation choices.
The optimal choice if the jury stops deliberating at t is the conditional expectation of D (equivalently, X t+1 ) given the prior history. As is well known, in this normal quadratic setting, this conditional expectation takes a convenient form:
Thus, the payo¤ to a juror experiencing a cost k when the jury stops at time t is given by
Note that this payo¤ is independent of the realizations of X 1 ; :::X t so, in this setting, in contrast with our prior analysis, there is no di¤erence between sequential and simultaneous deliberation.
From equation (5) we can immediately conclude that jurors with lower costs k want to stop later and we obtain a similar result to our original one concerning the e¤ects of deliberation rules:
Proposition 9 (Deliberation in Civil Juries) The accuracy of damage awards is higher under more consensual deliberation rules.
Note that, in equation (5), increasing the cost k has similar e¤ects to lowering the preference parameter : In particular, as mentioned above, cost heterogeneity plays a similar role to preference heterogeneity (when manifested through heterogeneous parameters in the jury).
8.4. Incomplete Information, Stationarity, and Hung Juries. Throughout the paper, we have assumed that jurors' preferences are commonly known. This assumption allowed us to focus on stationary strategies and extract the main tensions between the deliberation and decision phases.
Nonetheless, a natural extension to our model is to the case in which jurors have some incomplete information about the learning process at hand, either due to preferences that are not commonly known or due to the informativeness of the collective signals not being fully transparent. In such environments, the process of deliberation confounds two learning processes: regarding the guilt of the defendant, and regarding the prevailing characteristics of the jury (distribution of preferences or signal informativeness). In particular, the deliberation phase is inherently non-stationary.
While the analysis of such a model requires some novel techniques and goes beyond the scope of the current paper, we view it as especially important for explaining the patterns identi…ed by the empirical literature regarding hung juries. Indeed, in such a model, it is conceivable that the longer deliberation goes on, the more likely it is that jurors are "high strung" or that the process is not very informative, and that agreement is likely to take a longer time than was initially estimated.
Under certain additional conditions, this modi…cation is likely to deliver that hung juries deliberate longer. 38 This would be in line with the evidence provided by Kalven and Zeisel (1966) and Hans (2003) , who …nd that hung juries deliberate a signi…cantly longer time than juries that deliver a verdict. 39 Furthermore, the tensions between costly information collection and decision accuracy, that are the driving force of our results, would persist in such a setting.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider p 1 ; p 2 p. For both p 1 and p 2 the decision maker can choose to stop. In this case,
p follows from the same argument as in the unconstrained case. Namely, consider an alternative world in which with probability ; the posterior probability that the defendant is guilty in the period that follows is given by p 1 and with probability 1 ; that probability is given by p 2 : If the agent is not told which of the two posteriors had been realized, she can guarantee the continuation value corresponding to p 1 + (1 ) p 2 : However, if she is told which of the two probabilities is realized, then with probability , she can guarantee the continuation value of p 1 and with probability 1 the continuation value of p 2 : Since she can always ignore the information provided to her, in the latter case she must be gaining at least as much, and convexity follows. Similar arguments follow for p 1 ; p 2 p:
Proof of Lemma 2
For any p; p; p;
Consider p 1 > p 2 : From (4) it follows that for any p; V 1 (p j p; p 1 ) V 1 (p j p; p 2 ): There are two cases to consider. In the …rst case, p a p; p 2 < p, so that the solution is given by the intersection between the line (1 q)p; which is decreasing in p (see Figure 1 ) and the convex part of V 1 (p j p; p 2 Proof of Proposition 2 Part 1. Suppose that p a p a (q; k) and p c p c (q; k) are the unique interior equilibrium thresholds for preference parameter q and cost k: Directing our attention to p a , it must be the case that …rst order conditions hold:
Second order conditions must hold as well, so that 
0:
From the second order condition, if follows that in order to satisfy the …rst order condition for q + " when we …x p c ; the threshold p a must increase.
From Lemma 2, we can iterate on best responses and get that the optimal threshold p a (q +"; k)
p a = p a (q; k): Similar arguments follow for the threshold p c :
Part 2. The cost k does not a¤ect the payo¤s from stopping and taking a decision (the lines (1 q)p, and q (1 p) in …gure 1). However, as k increases, the continuation value V 1 (p) decreases point-wise. Since p a (q; k); p c (q; k); satisfy
the comparative statics with respect to k follows.
Proof of Lemma 3
In order to stress the dependence on preference parameters; we use p a p; p; q ; p c p; p; q to denote the solution to the constrained problem (4) for an agent with preference parameter q: Consider then any candidate equilibrium de…ned by thresholds p ; p such that p = p a (p ; p ; q n R d +1 ), and
. By Corollary 1, the best responses p a (p ; p ; q) and p c (p ; p ; q) are increasing in q. This means that, when p p, p p c (p ; p ; q) for at least R d agents, and, analogously, when p p, p p a (p ; p ; q) for at least R d agents, so that in both cases there is a quorum for stopping deliberation whenever p p or p p. It is also clear that whenever p is in (p ; p ) there is no such quorum. It follows that, in equilibrium, in must be the case that p = p a (p ; p ; q n R d +1 ), and p = p c (p ; p ; q R d ) ; as required.
Proof of Lemma 4
As k decreases to zero, for any q 2 (0; 1), p a (q; k) converges to zero and p c (q; k) converges to one: as information collection becomes extremely cheap, all types of jurors demand a high degree of con…dence before either convicting or acquitting. Thus, for any 0 < p 1 < p 2 < 1, there is a k such that any stationary equilibrium thresholds p and p satisfy p < p 1 and p > p 2 .
Proof of Proposition 3 
Proof of Lemma 5
Suppose there are two symmetric threshold equilibria: (p ; p ) and (p ;p ) : Suppose p <p :
From the monotonicity captured in Lemma 2, it must be the case that p p : This would implỹ p +p > p + p = 1; in contradiction to the equilibrium (p ;p ) being symmetric. would induce a hung jury, which is not optimal for k su¢ ciently close to k. This reasoning holds for any k such that obtaining a verdict is better than a hung jury for the pivotal jurors at the deliberation stage. This holds as long as k is not too high, i.e., lower than some k. Clearly, any p < q n R v +1
cannot be a best response to any p qR 
Proof of Proposition 6
Consider the expression for juror payo¤s from equation (3) . In a quasi-symmetric jury, equilibrium thresholds are symmetric and so p (
; and 1 E (pjp (R d )) = E (pjp (R d )) : Slightly abusing notation by dropping the conditioning on the two thresholds, we can write (3) as:
This expression shows that preferences over deliberation rules are independent of q. To show that all jurors prefer the least inclusive deliberation rule, suppose …rst that two jurors with preference q = 1=2 existed (symmetry entails there being an even number of jurors having such a preference). 
Proof of Proposition 7
Recall that a hung jury leads to equal probabilities of conviction and acquittal. Given rules R d
and R v , payo¤s to a juror with preference q are then given by:
U (R d ; R v ; q) = q (1 E (p t jp t q Rv )) Pr (p t q Rv )
(1 q) E (p t jp t < q n Rv+1 ) (Pr (p t < q n Rv+1 )) + 1 2 E ( q (1 p t ) (1 q)p t jq n Rv+1 < p t < q Rv ) (Pr (q n Rv+1 < p t < q Rv )) :
With symmetric juries, q n Rv+1 = 1 q Rv , E (p t jp t < q n Rv+1 ) = 1 E (p t jp t q Rv ), and Pr (p t < q n Rv+1 ) = Pr (p t q Rv ). Furthermore, symmetry implies that 1 2 E ( q (1 p t ) (1 q)p t jq n Rv+1 < p t < q Rv ) = 1 4
is independent of q: 41 Therefore, U (R d ; R v ) = E (p t jp t < q Rv ) Pr (p t < q n Rv+1 ) + U (H) (Pr (q n Rv+1 < p t < q Rv )) :
This expression is independent of q. Therefore, jurors are unanimous in their deliberation votes, implying that the deliberation rule R d is irrelevant. However, the decision rule R v does matter: a larger R v raises the probability of a hung jury. This feeds back into the optimal sample size (for the unanimous jurors). Thus, a larger R v implies more information collection. 4 1 Indeed, note that Pr(pt < 1 2 jqn Rv +1 < pt < qR v ) = Pr(pt > 1 2 jqn Rv +1 < pt < q) = 1 2 :
Furthermore, for any pt; qn Rv +1 < pt < qR v ; it must be that qn Rv +1 < 1 pt < qR v and q(1 pt) (1 q)pt q(1 (1 pt)) (1 q)(1 pt) = 1:
